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CONTRACT LAW
I. ARCHITECT NOT ENTITLED TO FEES UNLESS DESIGNED BUILDING
CAN BE CONSTRUCTED FOR AMOUNT NOT SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN
THAT STIPULATED BY PROPERTY OWNER

In Peteet v. Fogarty" the South Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed a 1950 supreme court decision 2 that an architect cannot recover
compensation on a contract when the probable cost of construction
substantially exceeds the agreed maximum cost of the building. The
court found that a $307,000 bid for construction substantially exceeded
an agreed upon $150,000 maximum cost.3
Bill and Regina Fogarty contracted with Frank Peteet, an architect, to design a new house. The maximum cost of the building was to
be $150,000. The Fogartys agreed to pay Peteet a total fee of ten percent of the construction costs, payable in increments, with forty percent of the total fee due upon completion of the design phase. By the
time the plans for the house had been completed, the Fogartys had
paid Peteet $10,000. Peteet then demanded an additional $5,000 fee.4
Mr. Fogarty complained the additional $5,000 fee was unreasonable because the cost of the house was not to exceed $150,000. Peteet
then revealed that he had received a bid of $307,000 on the plans. The
parties subsequently ceased negotiations and Peteet sought to foreclose
on an architect's lien on the property. The Fogartys asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. A special referee heard the case and dismissed Peteet's complaint, instead awarding the Fogartys $10,000 in
damages (the amount of fees paid to Peteet) plus costs. Peteet appealed the special referee's order.5
The court of appeals affirmed the order of the special referee and
re-emphasized South Carolina's traditional application of the relaxed
version of the rule concerning architects' entitlement to compensation. 6
Nationwide, two rules exist regarding an architect's breach of a contractual limitation on the cost of a building.7 The minority rule is strict

1. 297 S.C. 226, 375 S.E.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1988).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Beacham v. Greenville County, 218 S.C. 181, 62 S.E.2d 92 (1950).
Peteet, 297 S.C. at 229, 375 S.E.2d at 529.
Id., 375 S.E.2d at 528.
See id.

6. Id., 375 S.E.2d at 528-29.

7. See Annotation, Effect on Compensation of Architect or Building Contractor
of Express Provision in PrivateBuilding ContractLimiting the Cost of the Building, 20
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and absolute, requiring that "an architect cannot recover compensation
on the contract if the actual or probable cost of construction exceeds
the agreed maximum cost."8 The majority rule is more relaxed. It provides that "an architect cannot recover compensation on the contract if
the actual or probable cost of construction substantially exceeds the
agreed maximum cost.""
In 1950, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided in Beacham v.
Greenville County ° that the strict rule of architect compensation was
too restrictive and adopted the more relaxed majority rule. Peteet v.
Fogarty reaffirms South Carolina's adherence to this rule. Thus, South
Carolina continues to follow the majority view on this issue.
The court in Peteet, however, declined to address a question unanswered by South Carolina law: Is the architect entitled to compensation when the substantial cost excess is due to the owner's actions?
Since Peteet failed to raise this point by exception, and the court
found no evidence in the record indicating the cost excess was attributable to the Fogartys, the court did not decide the issue.11 Other jurisdictions have decided the point and the majority view is that an archiif the cost excess is caused by the
tect is entitled to compensation
12
owner's change in plans.

South Carolina courts probably will have to address this issue in
the near future and are likely to join the majority of jurisdictions
which do not penalize the architect for actions of the owner. In Gallivan Building Co. v. S.H. Kress & Co.,13 an early case interpreting an
architect's contract, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered actions of an owner that resulted in excess costs of construction. The
court allowed the architect to recover compensation even though the
actual cost of construction was greater than the agreed maximum.
This, however, was not the main issue in Gallivan and the recovery
was permitted only because the architects price was merely an estimate; the owner did not object in time; the owner had already paid
more than the agreed percentage of the agreed maximum and, there-

A.L.R.3D 778 (1968).
8. Id. at 782.

9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. 218 S.C. 181, 62 S.E.2d 92 (1950).
11. See Peteet, 297 S.C. at 230, 375 S.E.2d at 529.
12. See, e.g., Loewy v. A. Rosenthal, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Mich. 1952);
Jones v. Pollock, 34 Cal. 2d 863, 215 P.2d 733 (1950); Wuellner v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
390 Ill. 126, 60 N.E.2d 867 (1945); Bruno v. Gauthier, 70 So. 2d 693 (La. Ct. App. 1954);
Griswold & Rauma, Architects, Inc. v. Aesculapius Corp., 301 Minn. 121, 221 N.W.2d 556
(1974); Cobb v. Thomas, 565 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). But see, e.g., Bruno v.
Williams, 76 So. 2d 41 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Walsh v. Saint Louis Exposition & Music
Hall Assocs., 101 Mo. 534, 14 S.W. 722 (1890).
13. 120 S.C. 502, 113 S.E. 342 (1922).
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fore, was deemed to have been aware that the construction costs were
going to exceed the agreed price. 14 Since the court in Gallivan established precedent for considering the owner's actions, it is probable that
in future cases courts will consider owners' actions along with those of
architects when evidence indicates an owner caused the costs to exceed
the agreed maximum.
Until the issue of owners' actions as a cause of excess construction
costs is properly raised, the court of appeals has indicated it will not
consider the issue.15 Instead, the court will adhere to the rule established in Beacham v. Greenville County and reaffirmed in Peteet v.
Fogarty. Architects are not entitled to compensation unless the buildings they are hired to design can be constructed for an amount not
substantially greater than that stipulated by the property owner.
Margaret A. Chamberlain

II.

COURT RELIES ON COMMON LAW TO FIND IMPLIED WARRANTY IN
CHATTEL LEASE

The South Carolina Court of Appeals found implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose in a lease of earth
moving equipment in C. Ray Miles Construction Co. v. Weaver.' 6 The
court held that under the South Carolina common law doctrine of caveat venditor, implied warranties are effective in leases of personal
property. 7 The decision follows a growing trend among courts to imply
warranties in leases.
The dispute arose over the lease of earth moving equipment by
Weaver from C. Ray Miles Construction Company. Miles Construction
sued to collect rent due under the lease. Weaver counterclaimed, alleging breach of express and implied warranties that the equipment was
reasonably fit for the purpose for which the Miles Construction knew it
would be used."8 The circuit court struck the warranty allegations from
the counterclaim, explaining that the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) only applies to contracts for sale.' 9 Weaver appealed.
The court of appeals readily disposed of the express warranty issue by maintaining that "there is no reason why the parties should be
prohibited from contracting for an express warranty on the personal

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 506-10, 113 S.E. at 343-44.
See Peteet, 297 S.C. at 230, 375 S.E.2d at 529.
296 S.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 472-73, 373 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 467, 373 S.E.2d at 905.
Record at 5-6.
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property which was the subject of the lease." 20 The court concluded
21
that the trial court erred in striking the express warranty claim.

To deal with the implied warranty claims, the court of appeals
looked to South Carolina's common law. Unlike England and every
other state, South Carolina imposes a warranty of soundness in sales: a
sound price warrants a sound commodity. 22 This warranty of sound-

ness is South Carolina's forerunner of the UCC's implied warranty of
merchantability. 23 South Carolina common law also implies a warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose in a sales transaction. 24 These implied warranties were established prior to drafting of the UCC and remain valid despite this state's adoption of the Code..
The court relied on Colcock v. Goode25 for the proposition that the
implied warranties need not be restricted to sales.26 In Colcock Goode
hired six slaves from Colcock, but one of the slaves was ill and could
work only part time. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that
"the doctrine of implied warranty arises as well from a contract of hire
as on the sale of slaves. ' 27 Applying that reasoning to the facts of
Weaver, the court found "[t]here is no logical reason for any distinction between contracts of sale and leases insofar as the recognition of
implied warranties is concerned. '26 The court remanded the case for a
determination as to whether the elements of the implied warranties
were met.
The court of appeals did not suggest an analogy between Article 2
of the UCC and the lease in Weaver. This option was foreclosed by its

20. Weaver, 296 S.C. at 468, 373 S.E.2d at 905-06.
21. Id., 373 S.E.2d at 906.
22. Id. at 468-69, 373 S.E.2d at 906; see also Southern Iron & Equip. Co. v. Barnberg, E. & W. Ry., 151 S.C. 506, 149 S.E. 271 (1929) (warranty of soundness implied
when locomotive purchaser relies on seller for representations about the engine's condition); Smith v. McCall, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220 (1821) (implied warranty of soundness
does not cover moral qualities of a slave); Barnard v. Yates, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.)
142 (1818) (warranty of soundness implied when buyer entitled to rely on seller's expertise); Lester v. Graham, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 182, 183 (1817) (sound price implies sound
product is the "settled law of the land"); Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324
(1793) (warranty of soundness implied in slave who died of smallpox the day after sale).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 reporter's comment (Law. Co-op. 1976).
24. See Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653
(1948) (implied warranty exists when seller knows purpose of purchase); Liquid Carbonic
Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931) (warranty will be implied that article is
suitable for its purpose); Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co. v. Ayer, 80 S.C. 292, 61 S.E. 557
(1908) (warranty exists that product will be fit for ordinary purpose).

25.
26.
27.
28.

14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 513 (1826).
See Weaver, 296 S.C. at 472, 373 S.E.2d at 908.
Colcock, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) at 516.
Weaver, 296 S.C. at 472-73, 373 S.E.2d at 908.
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earlier decision in Henderson v. Gould, Inc.2 s In Henderson the lessor
did not cite as error the circuit court's decision to strike the warranty
allegations. As a result, the court focused exclusively on the direct ap-

plicability of the UCC, and held that UCC implied warranties arise

only upon a sale."0 Henderson effectively ruled out future applications
of the UCC to leases by analogy, although it left open the option of
categorizing the lease as a sale subject to the UCC.31
Many courts that have found implied warranties in leases have
done so by analogy to the UCC.3 2 For example, in Hertz Commercial
Leasing Corp. v. TransportationCredit ClearingHouse,3 a New York
court determined that since a large number of commercial transactions
are conducted through lease arrangements similar to contracts of sale,
it would be inconsistent to treat leases differently than sales
contracts.3 4

Another way in which courts, including the South Carolina Supreme Court, have applied the UCC to leases has been to interpret the
lease as a contract for sale. In Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v.
Way"5 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a lease agree-

29. 288 S.C. 261, 341 S.E.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1986).
30. See id. at 267, 341 S.E.2d at 810.
31. For a discussion of application of Article 2 of the UCC to leases and the categorization of leases as contracts of sale, see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in
Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957). Farnsworth discusses different approaches courts have taken in applying implied warranties to non-sale cases. He determines the application of the sales rules by analogy "is preferable to categorization of the
contract as one of sale and direct application of the sales statute." Id. at 667. The author
identifies five advantages to reasoning by analogy. The first is that analogy does not
place a court in the position of completely changing long-standing positions concerning
the definition of sales. "[I]t is awkward and misleading for a court to explain that what
yesterday was not a sale, is today a sale." Id. Second, analogy avoids applying other sales
rules which have no place in the transaction. These rules include the provisions requiring
the buyer to notify the seller of a breach within a reasonable time after he knows or
should know of it. Third, analogy can extend implied warranties to transactions which
should logically have them, but which could not be defined as sales. Fourth, with direct
application of the sales act, subsequent cases in which policy may prohibit a court from
implying warranties may be indistinguishable as sales, leading to artificial lines of reasoning. Fifth, use of analogy enables court decisions to rest on the real reasons for implying warranties, rather than on characterization of the transaction. Id. at 667-69.
32. See, e.g., Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64
Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 395; see also Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics Inc., 125 Misc. 2d 68, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (applying by analogy UCC
implied warranty provisions, including those of disclaimer and procedural unconscionability, to a corporate lease of an automobile).
35. 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974).
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ment in which the lessor could buy back refrigeration equipment
merely by paying sales tax after thirty-six monthly payments by the
lessee. The court found the lease to be a contract for sale.36 "The true
and real consideration for the sale of the goods, with interest thereon,
was obviously embodied in the so-called rental payments required by
the document purporting to be only a lease.

'3

7

The court in Way pro-

to apply the implied warranty provisions of the UCC to the
ceeded
-'lease.,,38
The court of appeals in Weaver did not categorize the lease as a
sales contract since the lessor did not have to repurchase the equipment from the lessee. The court also did not address how such an analogy would be affected by the imposition of implied warranties on lease
agreements. Since the court's previous decision in Henderson precluded application of the UCC to leases, and since the lease in Weaver
was not in the nature of a sale, its finding of implied warranties necessarily was based on old South Carolina common law doctrines originally applied in slave dispute cases.
Although not cited by the court of appeals in Weaver, the supreme
court in PioneerManufacturing Co. v. Columbia Equipment Rentals,
Inc.30 arguably acknowledged that implied warranties may attach to
leases. In that case the lessee of a truck successfully sued the lessor for
breach of implied warranty. The lessee appealed the trial court's denial
of his motion for directed verdict. The South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized that the plaintiff's "action [was] predicated upon the contention that when the defendant rented the truck, an obligation or
warranty, similar to the implied warranty of fitness in the sale of personal property, was imposed, as a matter of law, upon the
defendant."' 0
The court in Pioneer acknowledged that as a general rule other
jurisdictions hold that a warranty is implied by law on the bailor of
leased chattels, but stated that even "[a]ssuming the soundness

. . .

of

the general rule of law relied upon by plaintiff," the court could not
determine that the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict.4 1 The
court stated that while it was "unnecessary to fully consider the general rule relied upon by plaintiff,. . . a jury issue was presented as to
whether the damages sustained by the plaintiff were proximately
caused by any breach of such implied warranty on the part of the de36. Id. at 108, 208 S.E.2d at 34.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 108-09, 208 S.E.2d at 34; see also Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,
244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (five-year lease found analogous to a sales contract).
39. 247 S.C. 452, 148 S.E.2d 48 (1966).
40. Id. at 456, 148 S.E.2d at 49.

41. Id.
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fendant."4 2 The Pioneer court did not cite any South Carolina cases,
including Colcock v. Goode,43 which was relied upon by the court of
appeals in Weaver, to support the plaintiff's contention. In fact, no
court prior to Weaver had ever cited Colcock for the proposition that a
warranty may be implied in a non-sales transaction. To resurrect a
case which lay dormant for 162 years demonstrates the lengths to
which the court had to go to justify its decision.
The South Carolina common law rule of caveat venditor was applied earlier, however, to the sale of real property. In Lane v.
Trenholm Building Co.4 4 the court imposed implied warranties of qual-

ity to the seller of new buildings, regardless of the identity of the
builder. In that case, as in Weaver, the court did not apply the UCC by
analogy. Instead, the court based its decision on the common law rule
of caveat venditor.4 The Lane court acknowledged that UCC implied
warranties may not have been applicable, since the seller of the home
may not have been a merchant. Nonetheless, it indicated that the uniformity of the UCC was not essential to the question presented, since
the sale of buildings was a local concern. 6
The application of implied warranties to leases also has been addressed by the American Law Institute. Proposed Article 2A to the
UCC applies implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose to leases.47 The requirements for application of the
implied warranties to leases are the same as those for sales in Article 2.
The implied warranty of merchantability for leases includes the requirement that the lessor be a merchant as defined by the UCC. South
Carolina may adopt Article 2A in the future. This action would codify
the Weaver decision with regard to implied warranties in leases and
thus establish uniform application of warranties in both lease and sales
transactions.
After Weaver, lessees will be concerned with what they must prove
to establish the implied warranties of quality. Since the court did not
base its decision on the UCC, the warranty elements set out in Article
2 are inapplicable. For instance, unlike the UCC, the common law warranty of soundness, which is analogous to the warranty of
merchantability, does not require the lessor/seller to be a merchant.
The supreme court in Lane specifically concluded the plaintiff need

42. Id. at 456, 148 S.E.2d at 50.
43. 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 513 (1826).
44. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
45. See id. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay)
324 (1793)).
46. Id. at 503-04, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
47. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-212, -213, 1B U.L.A. 684-85 (Proposed Final Draft 1987).
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not prove the defendant is a merchant as defined by the UCC. 48 This

conclusion, however, was based largely on the nature of the item sold
(realty), not on the theory of implied warranty.49
South Carolina courts in the future probably will be required to
look to the UCC to answer questions concerning implied warranties in
leases. The court of appeals simply should have overruled Henderson
and applied the UCC to leases by analogy. If the court had chosen this
route it would have reached the same result, aligned this state with
most other jurisdictions that have considered the issue, and avoided
inevitable confusion by creating identical standards for implied warranties, whether for leases or sales.
Although the court reached its decision by way of at least questionable reasoning, the decision itself was the right one. There is no
justification for distinguishing between purchasers and lessees with regard to implied warranties. This case creates a new cause of action for
lessees who receive defective property and also creates a defense to a
suit by the lessor for non-payment of rent.
Charles Russell Rogers, Jr.

III. COURT AWARDS OFFSETTING JUDGMENTS TO CONSUMER AND
INSTALLMENT CONTRACT ASSIGNEE WHEN CONSUMER REFUSED
CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCT

When a consumer finances a purchase of an automobile, discovers
his new vehicle is a "lemon," and after numerous attempts to have the
defects corrected refuses to make further payments on the loan, what
happens? In American Federal Bank v. White5" the consumer and the
bank, who was the assignee on the retail installment sales contract, discovered that neither party really wins nor loses.
Ray White purchased a new truck from an automobile dealer pursuant to a retail installment sales contract. The dealer subsequently
assigned the contract to American Federal Bank. White made a down
payment of $3,200 on the truck, purchased a vehicle service contract
for $588, and contracted to make forty-eight monthly payments of
$327 to pay off the loan. The new truck developed transmission
problems several days after White purchased it. White also discovered
the truck's paint was defective. He returned the truck to the dealer to
repair the defects, but after numerous attempts at repair, the defects

48. See Lane, 267 S.C. at 503-04, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
49. See id.
50. 296 S.C. 165, 370 S.E.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1988).
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still existed. After eight months of making monthly payments and
driving a defective truck, White refused to make further payments.
American Federal repossessed the truck after three monthly payments
had not been received. At the time of repossession White had paid
$4,510.56 (amount of down payment plus monthly payments paid).
The truck was sold for $9000.51
American Federal brought an action for deficiency judgment
against White for $2,871.28. White counterclaimed for breach of warranty, asking for damages of 4,510.56 (the amount he had paid for the
truck). The trial judge found the truck was defective on the date of
sale, the dealer had failed to cure the defects in the truck, and the
failure to cure was a breach of the express warranty and the service
contract.52 The court denied American Federal its deficiency judgment
and awarded White $4,510.56.11 American Federal appealed.
On appeal, American Federal argued it was error for the trial
judge to find there was a breach of the service contract, since the
dealer repeatedly tried to repair the defect. The court of appeals rejected the argument that a service contract merely calls for "service"
and not results.5 It reasoned that while a seller may limit a buyer's
remedy to repair or replacement, such a limitation may fail the "essential purpose" of a service contract.5 5
American Federal further argued that White did not give proper
notice pursuant to the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, that
the amount awarded to White was improper, and that the trial court
erred in not awarding the amount of deficiency to American Federal,
since it was proved that a deficiency existed. 56 The court of appeals
relied on South Carolina Code section 37-2-40457 in its determination
that both the judgment against American Federal and the amount
awarded to White were error.58 Section 37-2-404 provides the consumer
a statutory right to assert any claims and defenses against the assignee
that the consumer has against the seller.5 9 This right, however, is accompanied by the following limitation:

51. Id. at 166-67, 370 S.E.2d at 925.
52. Id. at 167, 370 S.E.2d at 925-26.

53. Id., 370 S.E.2d at 925.
54. See id. at 169, 370 S.E.2d at 925-26.
55. Id. at 169-70, 370 S.E.2d at 926. The court relied on South Carolina Code section 36-2-719(2) to support its holding that the service contract failed in its essential
purpose, and thus allowed a remedy beyond repair and replacement of nonconforming
goods or parts. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).

56. See id. at 170-71, 370 S.E.2d at 927.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
58. White, 296 S.C. at 171, 370 S.E.2d at 927.
59. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404(1) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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A claim or defense of a consumer . . . may be asserted against the
assignee. . . only if the consumer has made a good faith attempt to
obtain satisfaction from the seller. . . and then only to the extent of
the amount owing to the assignee with respect to the sale . . . of the
property . . . at the time the assignee has written notice of the claim
or defense.. . . [W]ritten notice is any written notification other than
notice on a coupon, billing statement or other payment medium or
material supplied by the assignee.60
The only written notice of White's claims or defenses against the
assignee, American Federal, was the counterclaim. Nonetheless, the
court adopted a broad reading of the statute and found the counterclaim to be sufficient notice."' The statute clearly requires the consumer to assert the claims and defenses against the assignee in writing
and limits the claim to the amount owed to the assignee at the time
such notice is given. 2 After the sale of the repossessed truck, White
owed American Federal $2,871.28. Thus, the maximum judgment
White could obtain against American Federal was $2,871.28. It is
equally clear, however, that White still owed American Federal that
same amount. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial judge's finding of
liability against American Federal, reversed the decision denying
American Federal's claim against White, and remanded the case for
entry of offsetting judgments in the amount of $2,871.28. e 1
Other jurisdictions have permitted recovery beyond the limited
right to repair or replacement when the essential purpose of a service
contract has been found to have failed.64 The only defense available to
the seller appears to be a showing that the defect was cured before the
action was brought, regardless of how long it took to repair the
vehicle.0
The White court indicated additional recovery also is possible in

60. Id. § 37.2-404(2).
61. See White, 296 S.C. at 171, 370 S.E.2d at 927.
62. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404(2) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
63. White, 296 S.C. at 172, 370 S.E.2d at 927.
64. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1983); Walker
Ford Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 578 S.W.2d 23 (1979); Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123
Ga. App. 550, 181 S.E.2d 694 (1971); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801
(Miss. 1982); Welch v. Fitzgerald-Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 430 A.2d 144 (1981);
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Ricks, 16 N.C. App. 491, 192 S.E.2d 707 (1972);
McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289
(1983); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Ct. App.

1986).
65. See, e.g., Collum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 6 IlM.
App. 3d 317, 285 N.E.2d 532 (1972);
Mattson v. General Motors Corp., 9 Mich. App. 473, 157 N.W.2d 486 (1968); Ford Motor

Co. v. Olive, 234 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1970); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663
(Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
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this state, noting, "White may seek to recover any damages in excess of
those recoverable from American from the seller. . . since the seller is
liable on the underlying sales contract and warranty. 6 6 If the seller is
judgment proof, however, consumers will be unable to recover, and will
have to suffer the loss. Cautious assignees should create for themselves
similar contractual rights to recover for losses due to the wrongdoing of
assignors. Of course, they will face the same problem as consumers if
the seller is judgment proof.
The effect of American Federal Bank v. White is that neither
party loses and neither party wins. South Carolina Code section 37-2404 prevents the consumer from actually receiving an award against
the assignee, but at the same time protects him from the assignee due
to the offsetting judgments. Based on this section and under facts similar to those in White, assignees often will be unable to collect on deficiency judgments. This loss, however, is countered by the fact that assignees will be protected from paying judgments based on contractual
breaches by assignors. Although the court established no firm guidelines as to when a breach of a service contract occurs, it indicated from
its holding that eight months is a reasonable amount of time within
which to have completed repairs, and that dissatisfied consumers will
be entitled to the remedy enunciated in this case after that time.
0. Carlisle Edwards, Jr.

66. White, 296 S.C. at 172, 370 S.E.2d at 927.
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